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Two Models for a Rawlsian Theory of
International Law and Justice
DANIEL W. SKUBIK*

I.

INTRODUCTION

John Rawls' A Theory of Justice' is a massive, impressive volume. As
Barry notes in his critique, "[iut weighs in at over a quarter of a million
words-about equivalent to three books of the average length of modern
books devoted purely to analysis and argument. .

.

. [F]rom the first

page to the last it is simply crammed with arguments."' Yet, for all the
topics thoroughly investigated which inform the arguments for his theory
of justice as fairness, the book is just as crammed with assumptions,' caveats,' and questions which cannot be either (further) pursued or considered except in passing.5
This need not be a severe drawback on its face. Too many authors
implicitly incorporate these limiting devices without notice to the reader,
making analysis cumbersome and difficult. By being explicit, Rawls has
done his readers and critics valuable service. On the other hand, it is difficult to gauge the success of the over-all argument for justice as fairness
when the reader begins to accumulate a number of reservations. Just how
important are certain caveats or unanswered queries to Rawls' theory?
The purpose of this paper is to explore but one of these troublesome
areas of reservations and queries which arise with Rawls' full account of
his theory of justice and to chart the consequences of troubling these waters. The area of focus here selected is the intimated extension of justice
as fairness between societies to develop a theory of global reciprocity. Our
focus then, will be limited to the problems arising from Rawls' account of
international justice and the principles which can be derived from an
original position for a law of nations. It is in exploring this account that
we hope to analyze and to expand upon a number of the assumptions and
workings of the domestic theory of justice as fairness provided in the text.
* B.A., B.S., California Baptist College; M.A. (hons.) University of Melbourne; J.D.,

UCLA College of Law. Currently in private practice as a Legal and Political Risk Consultant in Canberra, Australia.
1. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)[hereinafter cited as TJ].
2. B. BARRY, THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 1 (1973).
3. Phrases such as "I assume," "it seems reasonable," "seems widely agreed that," and

"we may suppose," occur frequently throughout the work.
4. See TJ, supra note 1, sec. 42 at 265, opening remarks of sec. 42 on economic theory.
See also id. sec. 69 at 452.
5. Eg., closing remarks of sec. 59 on non-ideal theory. Id. sec. 59 at 391. See also opening remarks of sec. 18 on principles for individuals. Id. sec. 18 at 108.
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Although Rawls expresses the belief that his account of international
justice naturally leads to principles for a law of nations with which we are
familiar,6 it is not at all obvious that this should be so. In fact, we might
wonder at such an innocuous outcome being the ready result of extrapolations from domestic principles of justice which were themselves derived
from such controversial devices as maxims with no less controversial results like lexical ordering in the special conception. And we shall quickly
discover that analyzing these ready extrapolations will be extremely
troublesome. This is so for two reasons: (1) the treatment accorded the
derivation and application of principles for international law is so minimal as to be near lacking;7 and (2) the assumptions underlying this treatment and their consequences for international justice are never dealt with
systematically.8
Indeed, we shall find little guidance even in the mass of secondary
literature generated since the publication of Rawls' treatise. The few articles which do direct themselves to the account of international justice
tend to focus only upon preliminary questions of the theory's structure,9
usually relating to issue-specific applications like the assumption of selfsufficiency and the politics of the difference principle, 10 or the principle of
non-intervention and the politics of human rights.1" The questions are
then always pursued within a general framework of contemporary nonideal international relations.
While these articles raise significant questions, a theoretical frame-

6. Id. at 387
7. In fact, fewer than two full pages are dedicated to the discussion of principles of
international law. Id. at 377-79. These pages are within the general discussion of conscientious refusal in time of war. Id. sec. 58, at 377-82. Other references are mere notes that the
principles for the law of nations will not be taken up except in passing. Id. at 8, 108, 115.
8. In addition to the references cited in the previous note, an important paragraph for
our purposes occurs in id. at 457. There an assumption is bared but altogether this seems
precious little in 587 pages of dense text. Nonetheless, this lack of systematic discussion,
however curious, should not be taken to indicate that Rawls dismisses the issue. Two of
Rawls' subsequent articles in defense of his domestic theory also collaterally address the
issue of international scope, particularly as regards the nature of the basic structure he is
attempting to construct. See Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, in VALUES AND
MORALS, 47, 57, 70 (A. Goldman & J. Kim eds. 1978). [hereinafter cited as BSS]. See also
Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 524 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as KCMT], where he defends his notion of "self-contained national community". The
fact that he broaches the topic of international justice from the detailed framework of societal justice which he does provide indicates an expectation that his theory can be naturally
extended. TJ, supra note 1, at 377. Framing this extension and tracing its consequences are
the tasks of this essay.
9. E.g., D'Amato, InternationalLaw and Raws' Theory of Justice, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 525 (1975).
10. Representative of this is the work by Beitz, Justice and InternationalRelations, 4

PHIL & PUB.

360 (1975). This article appears in revised and expanded for in C. Beitz,
(1979).
11. Wicclair, Rawls and the Principle of Nonintervention, in JOHN RAWLs' THEORY OF
SOCIAL JUSTICE 289 (H. Blocker and E. Smith eds. 1980)
AFF.
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work for an ideal strict compliance theory for international justice remains unexplicated, both by Rawls and his critics. It is this missing
framework and its applications which we shall attempt to supply in the
remainder of this essay. In fact, after uncovering some ambiguities and
questionable assumptions, it will become possible to develop clearly two
disparate models of well-ordered societies existing as subjects of international justice. It is argued that both models are consistent with Rawls'
overall treatment of justice and both receive the "Rawlsian" label. Model
1 is based upon the primary presentation found in A Theory of Justice;
Model 2 is that theory which develops from questioning some of the conceptual ambiguities of society and international law grounding Model 1.
As might be expected, the consequences of these models' developments and operations are quite dissimiliar. The subsequent part of this
essay will explore the development of these two models, detailing the special features of their original positions. Based upon their respective positions, an exposition is formulated detailing principles to be chosen from
behind their respective veils of ignorance. Here, Model 1 will closely follow the limited account presented by Rawls. Model 2, on the other hand,
will begin to diverge in the description of its original position, yielding
strikingly different principles than those acknowledged under Model 1.
Part III completes the substance of the essay with a close examination of some of the practical consequences of the operations of both models in three hypothetical situations of international import. Based on the
theoretical and practical analyses generated, the paper concludes with a
summary evaluation of the models coherence and stability under the
Rawlsian device of reflective equilibrium. The question proposed is:
"Which model more closely matches considerations of justice as fairness
in an international arena"? Let us proceed to develop an answer.

II.

THEORY

Rawls' aim is to present a sophisticated social contract conception of
justice. Being so framed, it is not surprising that his theory incorporates
familiar elements found in the social compact theories of Locke, Rousseau
and Kant. But, justice as fairness is an attempt to transcend these traditional conceptions by generalizing at a higher level of abstraction."2 Thus,
while one of the central features of Rawls' theory of justice is a description of an initial status quo in which participants meet to formulate and
agree (contract) s upon principles for establishing a well-ordered society
(a common central feature of social contract theories), no particular society or form of government is envisioned (as is usually the case). Rather,
general principles for ordering the basic structure of society (and,

12. TJ, supra note 1, at viii, 3 and 11.
13. See Hampton, Contractsand Choices, 77 J. OF PHIL. 315 (1980), where it is argued
that this initial status quo, Rawls' "original position," effectively eliminates altogether a
contractarian interpretation of the resulting theory of justice.
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thereby, any society) are in view.
Derivation of such general principles is made possible through the
careful structuring of a hypothetical initial situation which is fair towards
all. That is, based upon a philosophical anthropology familiar to Kant,
the hypothetical ought to be so structured as to respect the freedom and
equality of human beings as moral agents. Conversely, the hypothetical
ought to nullify the accidents of natural endowments and the contingencies of social circumstance. Man qua man is hereby represented in the
initial situation and general principles for (generic) society can be meaningfully sought.
That the description of this initial situation plays a prominent role in
the development of a conception of justice for Rawls is evident not only
in that his theory is contractarian, but is presaged in the very name of his
theory. It is the description, itself, of an "appropriate initial status quo
which insures that the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair.
This fact yields the name 'justice as fairness'." 4 Now, he admits that
there exist numerous characterizations of such an initial situation. Proffered interpretations will vary
depending upon how the contracting parties are conceived, upon what
their beliefs and interests are said to be, upon which alternatives are
available to them, and so on. In this sense, there are many different
contract theories. Justice as fairness is but one of these. But the question of justification is settled, as far as it can be, by showing that there
is one interpretation of the initial situation which best expresses the
conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice
of principles yet which, at the same time, leads to a conception that
characterizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium. 6
Justice as fairness, it is argued, best satisfies these criteria. Considerations of fairness then will help shape the favored philosophical interpretation of the conditions which characterize this initial situation. Such conditions and their ramifications for principles of domestic justice are
discussed by Rawls under four headings: the circumstances of justice, the
formal constraints of the concept of right, the veil of ignorance, and the
rationality of the parties.1 6 The initial situation so characterized is what
Rawls designates the original position. What will constitute the focus of
our discussion in this part is the interpretation of the conditions noted
above, as given by Rawls, when extended to encompass the sphere of international justice as defined by our models.
A.

Model 1.

In beginning to develop an original position for our first model, it
should be noted that the conditions discussed by Rawls under two of the

14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 121.
16. Id. secs. 20-25, at 118-50.
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headings previously mentioned-the formal constraints of the concept of
right and the rationality of the parties-do not require extensive reanalysis and need not detain us. We can readily subsume the discussion on
generality, universality, publicity, ordering and finality within the international scope of Model 1. Since these constraints "hold for the choice of
all ethical principles,"' 7 they easily extend to our forum and are, in fact,
desirable conditions as given.
Likewise, his discussion of mutual disinterestedness (limited altruism), lack of envy, use of effective means and strict compliance, however
individually debatable,"8 can be incorporated without greatly influencing
development of our model. Indeed, desiring to develop a Rawlsian model,
Rawls' presentation should be adopted or incorporated wherever feasible.
As he has signalled no necessity to reevaluate these conditions when discussing international principles, the rationality of the parties shall also be
taken as given.
On the other hand, the remaining two headings-the circumstances
of justice and the veil of ignorance-and their conditions present some
difficulties. Within the framework provided by Rawls, the reader is signalled that modifications of these conditions are required when extending
the original position to encompass an international setting. Passing hints
are given concerning the substance of some changes.' 9 The extent of any
other modifications is less clear. Our interpretative task involves an analysis of all necessary modifications, their effects upon the participants and
any (new) constraints for international principles resulting from a modified original position. In an effort to chart these necessary modifications
and their effects, let us begin by reviewing Rawls' passing sketch of an
international original position, the changes he envisions, and the assumptions he invokes.
For Rawls, derivation of principles of justice for a law of nations is
the final choice problem in a three-item agenda for the participants in the
original position.20 The first choice problem focuses upon those principles

17. Id. at 130.
18. See, eg., Simson, Another View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 23 EMORY L.J. 473
(1974). See also R.P. WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS (1977), for a critical commentary on
these points.
19. It is assumed that those in the orginal position should act as representatives of their
nations to develop fundamental principles as between states; and that although still deprived of most specific information-such as the nation to which they do/will belong, its
particular circumstances and their own place in it-these representatives are to benefit from
a partial "lifting of the veil" and do know that (1) nation-states are the historical reality of
the day, and (2) these, like individuals-in-society, will have conflicts of interests. This thinner veil assumption is placed in relative time for us in TJ, supra note 1, at 109f; it lies
between the initial original position stage (no specific societal data injected into deliberations) of the four-stage sequence. Note that the former assumption appears to eliminate any
notion of an individual having a claim against a state. Neither apparently does a nation
which is not also a state have any such claims.
20. See the schematic diagram provided, id. at 109. Principles are to be chosen for (I)
social systems and institutions, (II) individuals, (IIa) natural duties, (IIb) obligations, (IIc)
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of justice which order the basic structure of individual societies. The solution to this problem is his two principles of justice as lexically ordered in
the special conception. Arriving at and defending this solution consumes
the greatest portion of his energies, as he argues for justice as fairness and
against competing conceptions like average utility.
The second choice problem concerns the various principles of obligation and natural duties as these apply to individuals. Although no complete or systematic account pertaining to this choice problem is offered,
that this problem is encountered as the second item on the original position agenda means
the choice of principles for individuals is greatly simplified by the fact
that the principles for institutions have already been adopted. The
feasible alternatives are straight-way narrowed down to those that
constitute a coherent conception of duty and obligation when taken
together with the two principles of justice."1
Certain examples and arguments disclosing the substantive nature of this
coherent conception briefly appear, in four widely separated sections,22
involving a principle of fairness coupled to various positive and negative
natural duties, including those of justice, mutual aid, mutual respect and
refraining from doing harm or injury.
Assuming this order of choice problems, when the participants reach
the end of this second agenda item of business, they will have agreed
upon a set of
principles of right as these apply to their own society and to themselves as members of it. Now at this point one may extend the interpretation of the original position and think of the parties as representatives of different nations who must choose together the fundamental
principles to adjudicate conflicting claims among states. 2
But before moving directly to a choice of principles, it will be necessary to
reexamine our initial situation. As previously noted, although no changes
in the understanding or interpretation of the original position were required as the argument moved from the first item of institutional principles to the second item of individual natural duty, differences in construction and interpretation of the original position are required as the
participants move to choice item three, the law of nations. These changes
occur in three categories: (1) our conception of the parties, (2) the circumstances of justice, and (3) the veil of ignorance.
The most straightforward change confronts us in the first category,
our conception of the parties. No longer do the participants represent
permissions, and (III) the law of nations. "The Roman numerals express the order in which
the various sorts of principles are to be acknowledged in the original position." Id. at 110.
21. Id. at 334 (footnote omitted).
22. Secs. 18 and 19 describe the principles for individuals. Id. secs. 18, 19 at 108-17.
Secs. 51 and 52 argue their acceptance as essential part of a conception of right.
23. Id. at 377-78
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continuing persons as mutually disinterested individuals. In addition, no
longer do the participants have in view the ordering of only the basic
structure of a single, undefined society. Rather, given that a society is
now assumed to be defined by the modern conceptual and actual boundaries of a nation-state, the participants find themselves representing different nations in an initial situation where they are to choose principles for
structuring the relations between these new, higher-order parties. 2' Thus,
it can reasonably be assumed (though it is not absolutely clear) that the
parties-the nation-states so represented, are all well-ordered societies
and that these well-ordered societies need (desire?) to choose principles
to order their interaction and to adjudicate any conflicting claims.
The second category of the circumstances of justice also incorporates
a number of changes. 26 In part, these changes in interpretation are due to
the change of forum, since we are now dealing with global cooperative
schemes or boundaries. However, not the least of the changes are in response to the shift in understanding of the conception of the parties inhabiting the original position. The circumstances require sufficient reinterpretation so that it makes sense to ask if, and how, they might apply to
well-ordered nation-states as parties. For example, the second circumstance of justice indicates that parties are expected (though certainly not
required) to have divergent fundamental basic beliefs. How are we to understand this expectation in relation to a number of well-ordered socie-

24. A number of interesting queries arise here, for example in fulfiUing their representative functions, do the participants actually come from different nations or merely reason
as if they are from different nations (rather like reasoning as if they were risk averse)? Id. at
172. This is unclear because the subsequent contractual arena, a constitutional convention
in the four-stage sequence, appears to involve the identical participants; yet clearly, only a
single society is there in view and the participants are once again only continuing persons.
Id. at 196. Is representation divided o allow one participant per nation, or more than one?
Might nation A have one representative while nation B has three? These questions may
seem trivial, but they are tied to the much more important issue of legitimacy of representation. By what authority or conception of right can the participants move from their status as
continuing persons to wholesale representatives of nations? As Rawls notes in reference to
his domestic principles of justice, "the hypothetical nature of the original position invites
the question: why should we take any interest in it, moral or otherwise"? Id. at 587, 21. An
attenuated representation in a hypothetical original position to encompass the international
forum would appear to enhance the difficulties in formulating an adequate response.
25. Rawls describes the circumstances of justice as the normal conditions which characterize the objective and subjective factors of human cooperation which confront individuals
in (or in formation of) a well-ordered society. He deals with these factors in some detail. Id.
sec. 22 at 126-30. These factors may be summarized in the following manner: (1) conditions
of moderate scarcity exist; (2) there is a divergence of fundamental interests and ends, and a
variety of opposing and incompatible beliefs; and (3) the scheme of basic institutions is a
more or less self-sufficient and productive scheme of social cooperation for mutual good.
"Society" is here viewed as a "cooperative venture for mutual advantage" Id. at 520. The
summary is culled from the enumeration of the twelve features involved in the concept of a
well-ordered society in Rawls, Reply to Alexander and Musgrave, 88 Q. J. EcoN. 633, 635
(1974), where they appear as conditions (8)-(10). For a critical discussion and comparison of
Hume's and Rawls' use of such factors when characterized as circumstances of justice, see
Hubin, The Scope of Justice, 9 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1980).
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ties, all of which are ordered by the same coherent set of institutional and
individual principles?
Perhaps the best way to understand this circumstance in the immediate context is to distinguish two levels of meaning. At the higher level
of abstraction, it is certainly true that justice is the fundamental interest
of all well-ordered societies. In this there will be no divergence. But we
should not therefore conclude from this convergence that we are approaching an international society whose fundamental agreements belie a
need for principles of international justice. Rawls does, for example, present constitutional democracy as a type or structure which can conform
to his principles and, thereby, be just. But he never argues that only constitutional democracies are just. Similarly, ownership of the means of production could conceivably be private of public, capitalistic or socialistic,
in nature and still conform to the demands of justice."6
At a somewhat lower level of abstraction, then, it should not be surprising to see a variety of societal structures as each nation-state attempts to fulfill this interest of justice in differing forms. Based on these
type or structural differences, it should also not be surprising to discover
that two of more well-ordered societies, striving towards justice, develop
divergent goals and opposing beliefs. Thus, the focus of the question
posed by this circumstance is not whether disputes or conflicts will arise,
but on what basis they are to be resolved if and when they do. Interpreted in this light, the second circumstance of justice is readily incorporated into the new original position.
Unfortunately, the remaining two circumstances of justice pose more
difficult problems of reinterpretation and incorporation. They will not be
so easily maneuvered into place. Turning to the first circumstance, we
find the statement that conditions of moderate scarcity exist. While this
condition makes reasonable sense when individuals within a single society
are in view, it does not have any apparent application to and between
well-ordered societies of nation-states. Recall the numerous phrases employed to designate these boundaries of cooperation: "a closed system isolated from other societies"'2 7 . . . "self-sufficient scheme of social cooperation"" . . . " a closed and self-sufficient system of cooperation. 2 9 To the
extent that a well-ordered society is truly self-sufficient, a condition of
any overall level of scarcity has little meaning or application. If self-sufficiency and closedness holds, any principles of interaction or adjudication
that might be chosen would merely lie unused; no conflicts would ever
arise, for no reciprocal interaction would ever be necessary. Any contacts
which might occur would be handled simply on an ad hoc basis.
26. Id. at 195 and 280. This discussion assumes, of course, that it makes sense to speak
of nations as having distinctive goals and beliefs. Whether this assumption is legitimate is
examined in the discussion concerning the veil of ignornance, infra.
27. Id. at 8.
28. BSS, supra note 8, at 70.
29. KCMT, supra note 8, at 524.
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Presumably, Rawls is prepared to relax the supposition of self-containment when treating the law of nations.30 This is again not wholly
clear, but given such a relaxation a plausible reading of this circumstance
is that "moderate scarcity" might refer to the wide and uneven distribution of natural and other resources throughout the world. Being a matter
of general knowledge for the parties, this fact of uneven distribution
would be known and considered. Thus, every country might be expected
to be able to supply some, or perhaps even most, of its needs for a time.
Yet, no country could reasonably expect to perpetually supply all of its
needs from internal resources alone. Too may natural resources are nonrenewable and chances are that some natural and technological resources
will be lacking entirely. Sooner or later, the society will be required to
seek to supplement its own resources by reaching outside its territorial
borders. In such instances, principles of interaction and adjudication are
mandatory. This same line of reasoning applies as well to the internal
development of technological and other resources for use and export.
Principles of reciprocity as between states will then be needed to order
necessarily expanding contacts of state parties. If this interpretation
holds, the circumstance can be reworded or understood to state that conditions of unevenly distributed and limited resources exist as between societies of nation-states, giving rise to conflicting claims. Still, this interpretation remains only plausible.
The third circumstance of justice relates directly to the first and requires elucidation before the latter can be made firm. The third circumstance states that a scheme of basic institutions exists which is (more or
less) self-sufficient and productive for mutual good. Again, while this condition reads reasonably well when individuals in society are in view, that
such a scheme exists in the international forum is patently not the case.
(Emphasis here is on the lack of a pre-defined scheme of authoritative
institutions in the model; a debatable contemporary historical void is here
only of contingent and secondary interest or concern.) Even were the
wording modified to indicate that such a scheme "can" or "might" exist,
we would still run headlong into statements like those above which noted
self-sufficiency, or this capstone: "a well-ordered society is a closed system; there are no significant relations to other societies, and no one enters
from without, for all are born into it to lead a complete life.""' Understood definitively, no degree of relaxation short of repudiation will get
around such firm statements concerning the nature of the parties.
Nevertheless, the enterprise need not be abandoned just yet. One option remains. It could be maintained that a statement like "there are no
significant relations" simply recognizes the factual situation at the time
the parties enter this stage in the original position to organize institutional structures to administer principles of adjudication. If such a read-

30. TJ, supra note 1, at 457.
31. KCMT, supra note 8, at 536.
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ing were permissible, we could reinterpret this third circumstance to indicate that a scheme of basic institutions "needs" or "ought" to be
established which "can" order interaction and adjudicate conflicting
claims between parties, based upon fundamental principles yet to be contracted, due to the conflicts conceivably arising under the first two circumstances of justice as reinterpreted in the discussion above.
Of course, this is no longer, strictly speaking, a mere factual claim of
circumstance. It contains a normative element, as well. But such a reading should not come as a complete surprise or generate too great an apprehension, since the parties already have a significant set of institutional
and individual principles to hand. Breakdown in the original position
leading to statal egoism in the international forum would not likely be
deemed desirable by parties who are otherwise commited to and are striving for justice. If this "ought" is conceded, the understandings reached
should allow incorporation of these reinterpretations in an international
original position. This analysis should also complete our discussion of the
changes required in category two.
Only one category remains, the third category of the veil of ignorance. Like the change in the first category pertaining to the parties, this
presentation is relatively straightforward. But it also raises similar
problems of justification. Recall that during the first two agenda items in
the original position, no specific information is available to the
participants.
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status;
nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like. Nor, again, does
anyone know his conception of the good ....
More than this, I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of
their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political
situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to
achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to
which generation they belong."
This passage focuses upon the negative aspects of their position,
what they do not know. The only particular facts available are that the
circumstances of justice (and whatever these imply) apply to their society. Positively, other passages indicate that there are to be no limitations
on general information, such as political and economic theory, laws of
human psychology and the basis of social organization.3 3 While Rawls has
been severely critized for the thickness of the veil,- his response is firm.
The parties are not to be influenced by any particular information
that is not part of their representation as free and equal moral per32. TJ, supra note 1, at 137.
33. Id. at 137-138.

34. One of the strongest critiques is provided by Hare, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 23
PHIL. Q. 144 (1973).
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sons . . . unless this information is necessary for a rational agreement
to be reached. . . .Even if these [thinner veil] restrictions led to the
same principles, the thicker veil would still be preferable, since these
principles are then3 5connected more clearly to the conception of free
and equal persons.
Turning to the ever so slight lifting of this veil for the third agenda
item, we find the introduction of an assumption and its corresponding
particular information. The assumption is that societies of the participants are to be characterized as nation-states and this new bit of information is revealed to them in their representative capacities. Other restrictions being equal, "the original position is fair between nations; it nullifies
the contingencies and biases of historical fate.""6
Time will not be spent working out reinterpretations of all the restrictions noted in the preceding passages as they relate to nation-states.
Most are easily converted and understood in their new context. However,
it should be noted that the veil-lifting prescribed severely diminishes the
universal application of this original position. Since the formative rising
of the nation-state is a relatively recent political phenomenon, dating
back little more than 350 years,3 7 it can no longer be said that the parties
"have no information as to which generation they belong." Perhaps this
assumption is simply a calculated concession to the present era of world
history in which we live. But, when only 350-odd years of nation-state
contingencies are nullified . . . when the parties can reasonably assume a
recent time frame in world history, it is difficult not to conceive this concession as morally arbitrary in a model otherwise devoted to ideal theory.
This criticism does no damage to the actual operation of the model; yet, it
does appear to limit its effective moral range.
A more serious problem arises in the context of nation-state parties
which does affect the operation of the model. Unless some organic assumptions of society previously rejected are brought into play," it seems
extremely difficult to understand what it means to transfer the free and
equal moral status of persons to national societies. If, indeed, this transfer cannot be made, it is not clear that the argument for requiring a
thicker veil should prevail. On a thinner account, all particulars could be
known (e.g. the actual distribution of all resources and the stages of development-political, cultural and economic-of the nations represented).
Only the personal characteristics, including nation-state citizenship, of
the representatives would remain behind the veil to insure the requisite

35. KCMT, supra note 8, at 549-50.
36. TJ, supra note 1, at 378.
37. While scholars differ as to datings, there is little disagreement that the origin of the
modern state is tied to the neologism of "sovereignty," which concept began to flourish in
the early 17th century. For representative discussion see H. KRABBE, THE MODERN IDEA OF
THE STATE (Sabine & Shepard trans. 1922); see also A. D'ErREvs, THE NOTION OF THE
STATE 89-103 (1967).

38. TJ, supra note 1, at 264.
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level of fairness.
On the other hand, it can be argued that free and equal moral status
does pertain to society as a collective. Rawls' early rejection of an organic
conception of society is arguably a rejection of "organ-ism" and not the
concept of collective responsibility and accountability. His discussion of
community and use of phrases such as "legitimate interest" in possessive
relation to society bear out this interpretation. Although a full-account of
a philosophical sociology is lacking in his treatise, the following gloss is
consistent with Rawls' presentation.
The notion of moral or collective personality-in which "personality"
has a proper analogical value-applies to the people as a whole in a
genuine manner: because the people as a whole (a natural whole) are
an ensemble of real individual persons and because their unity as a
social whole derives from a common will to live together which
originates in these real individual persons.39
Based upon such an interpretation of collectivity, the transfer of free and
equal moral status can be made in the new original position with the result that the thicker veil would still be preferable.
Discussion of the veil of ignorance closes the account of original position modifications. To conclude this rather lengthy discussion, a summary
chart follows. The column on the left (headed I and II) notes the first and
second choice problems relating to domestic institutional and individual
principles. The column on the right (headed III) provides a summary of
those conditions reinterpreted in light of the third choice problem relating to principles for a law of nations. Having now developed the structure
for an international original position, we can begin to examine the solution to this third choice problem by indicating those principles which
would be chosen under the model. But before actually turning to these
principles of international justice, one analytic chore remains. It is first
necessary to briefly examine the constraints of choice, or derivation and
acknowledgement, as these apply to the reasonings of the parties in the
original position.

39. J. MARrrJN, MAN AND THE STATE 16 n.11 (1951).
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The first constraint resting upon the parties is that any feasible set of
alternatives embracing international principles must be narrowed such
that acknowledgment is consistent with the institutional and individual
principles already chosen. Just as the individual principles of the second
choice problem had to form a coherent conception when taken with the
constitutional principles of the first choice problem, international principles are to conform to the outlines of this previously established coherent
conception. Taken together, all three sets of choice-solutions should form
a coherent table of principles for a theory of justice as fairness.
The second constraint to be considered is based upon one of the conditions of the rationality of the parties. According to the condition of
strict compliance, the principles finally acknowledged will constitute the
basis for an ideal theory of international justice. That is, "the parties can
rely on each other to understand and act in accordance with whatever
principles are finally agreed to. Once principles are acknowledged the parties can depend on one another to conform to them."4 Because of this
constraint, the parties can be expected to concentrate on selecting those
principles of reciprocal advantage for well-ordered nation-states which
will become the foundation for the basic institutions of a well-ordered
society of nations. The stress on well-orderedness means that the parties
need not be overly concerned with developing rules for just wars or general sanctioning powers, save as these relate to the problem of assurance:
given human nature, a "stabilizing device" might be required to allay suspicion or lack of confidence between the parties due to the possibility of
the "free rider" problem when an otherwise ideal scheme is implemented. 4' This possibility ties the ideal theory envisioned to partial compliance theories and real-life conflict (thereby indicating the place and
value of ideal theory in a non-ideal world), but partial compliance is not
the theme of Rawls' work or our Rawlsian models. Since the parties are to
assume good faith, the problem of assurance need only be mentioned or
42
sketched in passing.
With these two constraints in mind, the parties can now consider the
principles required to solve the third choice problem of international relations. Indeed, assaying the very conception of the parties as free and
equal entities, the first principle of international justice to be acknowledged would be immediately apparent. This is the basic principle of
equality: "Independent peoples organized as states have certain fundamental equal rights. '48 This principle corresponds to the free and equal
status of individuals and is the consequence of the transfer of moral status of individuals to nation-states based upon the notion of collectivity in

40. TJ, supra note 1, at 145.
41. See Rawls' discussion of penal sanctions in a well-ordered society, id. at 240f, 267f
and 315.
42. Id. at 8f, 245 and 351. Some of the problems of application will be appraised in the
next part of this article.
43. Id. at 378.
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the original position.
Equality is a basic or fundamental principle in that contingent factors are not to affect recognition of this essential quality. This feature of
the principle of equality is also a familiar part of contemporary international legal thinking. An early international contract theorist, commenting on the moral equality of nations, notes that
just as the tallest man is no more a man than a dwarf, so also a nation, however small, is no less a nation than the greatest nation.
Therefore, since the moral quality of men has no relation to the size of
their bodies, the moral equality of nations also has no relation to the
number of men of which they are composed.
This same author also goes on to argue that the fundamental rights and
obligations of all nations are the same, even as between powerful and
weak nations, and that right is never to be measured by might. 4" A more
recent 19th century international legal theorist puts the case succinctly
when he writes,
equality cannot be affected by the casual qualities or attributes of a
State, such as antiquity, population, extent of territory, military
power, form of the constitution, title of its sovereign, state of civilization, respect which it enjoys, etc. No one of these considerations can
justify the least difference or the slightest distinction between nations
considered as moral persons.... 45
Lest there be any doubt, we might interpolate that "[nlo one or any combination of these considerations" affects the principle of equality as between states.
This principle of equality seems required by the very structure of the
original position and the constraints outlined above. What is not clear is
how this principle, once acknowledged, should influence further deliberation. Interpretation and extension of an egalitarian principle should proceed cautiously and in concert with prior principles.
Equality of the parties easily led in the first choice problem to a principle of greatest equal liberty in treating individuals-in-society,
[blut in the society of states the need is not for greater liberty for the
individual states, but for a strengthening of the social bond between
them, not for the clamant assertion of their rights, but for a more
insistent reminder of their obligations towards one another ....
[I]t
is not improbable, and it is certainly desirable, that there should be a

44. C. WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM secs. 16-18 (1764);
original reproduced and translated in 2 volumes in THE CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1516 (J. Scott ed., J. Drake trans. 1934). Though Wolff relies on, and Rawls denies, a selfevident natural law, both present contractual theories for international relations and justice.
45. 1 C. CALvo, DICTIONNAIRE DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ET PRIVE 286 (1885).
Cited in full by E. DICKINSON, THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 100-101
(1920); cited in part by Johnston, The Foundationsof Justice in InternationalLaw, in THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 122 (MacDonald ed. 1978).
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movement towards the closer interdependence of states."'
Granted the author is not here speaking to parties in a Rawlsian original
position, the caution is nonetheless legitimate. Although the parties
would be loath to acknowledge a principle requiring interdependence,
they would also be wary, given the model conditions outlined, of choosing
a principle or interpretation of equality which might hinder establishing
reciprocal relationships for mutual advantage. Rather, based upon these
model conditions, a principle of equality should be so interpreted to help
form the very basis of cooperation, not merely differentiation or hostility.
If interdependence in some from is probable, even desirable, then a
basic institutional structure is required to develop a framework for responsible interaction. A reciprocating equality in relations cannot reasonably be expected to evolve in an atmosphere of statal egoism. The principle of equality could not be preserved under such a scheme. To found a
reciprocal structure, two more basic or fundamental principles will need
to be acknowledged. The first of these is the basic principle of obligation,
know traditionally as the principle of pacta sunt servanda-treatiesor
agreements are to be observed. This principle is interpreted so as to encompass the individual analog of fairness, combined with the duty of mutual respect. 47 So rendered, the principle establishes the contours of reciprocity in statal relations.
The second of these additional principles which should be acknowledged or chosen is based, like that of equality, on the conception of the
parties behind the veil of ignorance. This conception requires the acknowledgment of continuing collective responsibility. That is, once collective responsibility is recognized and the transfer of free and equal status
is made from individuals to nations in the original position, accountability cannot later be shed."8 Nations must acknowledge and take responsibility for their international claims and actions.
These three principles form the basic triad for the international
structure of Model 1. They would be readily acknowledged as flowing

46. J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 50-51 (6th ed. 1963). Brierly's text is Rawls' one
and only cited authority for international affairs. We are even told that Brierly's work "contains all that we need here" for the development of international principles of justice. TJ,
supra note 1, at 378).
47. Remember that at the time of the transfer of moral status, individual principles had
already been acknowledged. Unless the contrary can be cogently argued, such individual
duties as these will also have transferred. For purposes of discussion under this model, we
shall assume they do, in fact, transfer legitimately to states; counter arguments could not be
successful. Cf. the statal duties outlined in Schachter, Towards a Theory of International
Obligation, 8 VA. J. INr'L L. 300 (1968).
48. Not all legal theorists would agree. Eg., Kelsen argues that collective responsibility
is a characteristic of primitive peoples and primitive legal systems. As an international law
develops, he would hope to see collective responsiblity diminish. Only in this critical light
does he admit, that collective responsibility is one of the characteristics elements of international law. See H. KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 25-26 (1942). But
cf. Cheng, Justice and Equity, 8 CURRENT LEGAL PRORS. 185 (1955).
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from the combinations of principles, constraints and conditions facing the
parties. But, these principles also imply a second-order triad of corollaries: self-determination (linked to the principle of equality), self-defense
(linked to the principle of collective responsibility) and self-limitation
(linked to the principle of pacta sunt servanda). These three additional
principles are the consequence of holding the first triad as basic to international relations.
In this context, self-determination means that each nation's conception of the good, being based in equality, is deemed legitimate and of
equal worth. Given that the particularities of specific conceptions are unknown behind the veil, the parties could not reasonably agree to a principle which might allow ranking of conceptions, thereby possibly putting
their nation's conception in jeopardy. Any other principle permitting one
nation's predominance over or interference in the internal affairs of another state, due solely to differing conceptions of the good, could not be
acknowledged or tolerated.
The corollary of self-defense, in this context, signifies not so much
the violence of warfare or military sanctions (remember that the parties
are well-ordered states), but addresses in light of collective responsibility
the right inhering to press claims based upon a nation's conception of the
good. Since all conceptions are deemed to be equal in worth under selfdetermination, the claims based in these conceptions must be allowed to
equally compete for resources.49
Finally, the meaning of self-limitation, which in this context is linked
to the pacta principle is two-fold. It acknowledges that a state has the
fundamental right to (a) entirely withhold a claim or claim of value, and
(b) restrict the scope of any claims which it can otherwise put forward
under self-defense. This corollary recognizes the independence of each
party to operate on the basis of its conception of the good and no party
can require another to act in accordance with its interpretation of the
50
other's best interest.
Taken together, these six principles form a complete foundation for
erecting a basic structure of background justice in the international
arena. Such was their derivation that these principles also form a coherent set when aligned with the solutions and constraint of the first two
choice problems of the model. This result closes the section and completes our initial task for the first Rawlsian model of international justice.

49. Rawls' indication of the traditional principles and meanings of self-determination
and self-defense appear at TJ, supra note 1, at 378. But cf. French & Gutman, The Principle of National Self-Determination, in PHILOSOPHY, MORALITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
138 (Held ed. 1974), where "nation" and "state" self-determinations are differentiated.
50. These corollaries may appear somewhat trivial, but they become important considerations in later rule development and effectiveness. As such, they would be acknowledged
as principles in this original position. See Wildeman, The PhilosophicalBackground of Effectiveness, EsSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS 355 (Meijers & Vierdag eds.
1977).
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We have developed its original position for an international forum and
have acknowledged the principles to be chosen under this model. We turn
in our next section to the complementary task of developing an original
position for and acknowledging principles to be chosen under Model 2.
B.

Model 2.

Under Model 1, the original position agenda contained three items or
choice problems: principles were to be acknowledged for the basic institutional structure, the natural duty of individuals and finally, the law of
nations. These problems were to be solved in the order given, so that international principles could be selected only after a coherent set of institutional and individual principles had first been established. This coherent set of principles would, in turn, narrow the range of feasible
alternatives for international principles, so that, at the conclusion of all
choice problems, the three solutions could form a complete and coherent
table of principles for a theory of justice as fairness. That the choice
problems were so framed was largely due to an assumption incorporated
in Rawls' theory of society. This assumption operated so as to circumscribe the denotations of community and society, making both terms synonymous with the modern notion of the nation state.5 '
Model 2 is the outcome of an attempt to break free of these restrictions in accord with the Kantian emphasis so often acknowledged in justice as fairness. This model is based upon distinctive understandings of
the concepts of community and society. "Community" here designates a

51. TJ, supra note 1, at 457. We discover the assumption which has been implicitly
operating throughout his argument when in section 69, "The Concept of a Well-Ordered
Society," the reader is informed that he is to "assume that the boundariesof these schemes
[i.e., the complex of major social institutions]are given by the notion of a self-contained
national community." That this notion implies the importation into theory of the modern
concept of the nation-state is made clear in later writings where the concept of the basic
structure is refined:
Now by assumption the basic structure is the all-inclusive social system that
determines background justice. (Observe that I leave aside here the problem of
justice between nation.)
The reason for doing this is that, as a first approximation, the problem of social justice concerns that basic structure as a closed background system. To
start with the society of nations would seem merely to push one step further
back the task of finding a theory of background justice. . . . We are better
prepared to take up this problem for a society (illustrated by nations) conceived as a more or less self-sufficient scheme of social cooperation and as possessing a more or less complete culture.
BSS, supra note 8, at 57, 70 (footnote omitted). This approach is reiterated in Kantian
Constructivism:
I am leaving aside two important matters: [one being] questions of justice between societies (the law of nations). . . . I shall simply proceed on the idea
that we may reasonably begin with the basic structure of one society as a
closed and self-sufficient system of cooperation.
KCMT, supra note 8, at 524.
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factual description of the nature of man as man-in-the-world; "society"
characterizes those voluntary relationships which develop as an expression of this community within a fixed or definite territory. These distinctions are maintained by acknowledging the fact of community as being
prior to and therefore separate from the phenomenon of society, and that
which is [to be] regulated by major institutions (i.e. a basic structure) of
international (understood as global) scale is essentially the former fact,
not the latter phenomenon.
Rawls' own description of the sociability of man, coupled with his
Kantian emphasis, points to a narrower notion of society and a broader
notion of community.5 2 Consider the Stoic notion of a world-wide
cosmopolis:
The positive substitute wherewith the Stoics thought to replace the
ordinary relations of civil society was by a citizenship of the world. No
preceding system had been able to overcome the difficulty of
nationalities.

If human society ... has for its basis the identity of reason in individuals, what ground have we for limiting this society to a single nation, of feeling ourselves more nearly related to some men than to
others? All men . ..are equally near, since all equally participate in
3
5

reason.

Similarly, in emphasizing the freedom and equality of moral persons
(especially as rationally autonomous agents in the original position),
Rawls himself, following Humboldt, speaks of "the notion of the community of mankind."" If such a notion of the community of man is more
than mere wish-projection, then a corresponding concept of society
should be developed which is not tied to specific political structures
(whether ancient city-state or modern nation-state), but is rather derived

52. TJ, supra note 1. Just as "various conceptions of justice are the outgrowth of different notions of society against the background of opposing views of the natural necessities
and opportunities of human life," we can only fully understand any particular conception of
justice by making "explicit the conception of social cooperation from which it derives" Id. at
9-10. Detailed discussion of Rawls' notion of society is provided in section 79, "The Idea of
Social Union." Id. at 520. See also infra note 58.
53. REiCHEL, THE STOICS, EPicuREANs AND ScEmIcs 326, 328 (Zeller trans. 1962). For

further discussion, see E. ARNOLD, ROMAN SToIcIsM at 275 (1911), where it is argued that the
"world-state is held together neither by force nor statecraft, but goodwill." For examples of
primary materials, see 4 SENECA, DE OTIo 1; 8 SENECA, DE O'o 2; 1 EPIcTETus, DiscouRSEs
9, and 4 MARcus AuRELIus, MEDFrATIONs 4. Phrases such as "citizen of the cosmos" and
"fellow citizens of a common [read 'universal'] political community" frequently recur in
Stoic discourse on politics. By proceeding in this way, we can quite readily follow Kant
when he notes that "the idea of a cosmopolitan right is not fantastical, high-flown notion of
right, but a complement of the unwritten code of law--constitutional as well as international law-necessary for the public rights of mankind in general and thus for the realization of perpetual peace. E. KANT, PRPgrUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY 21 (Smith
trans. 1948).
54. TJ, supra note 1, at 523.
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from this notion of human community. This approach permits development of an ideal theory of international justice uninfluenced by historical
politics. International law and international justice, in this context, are
individual-oriented, working through particular societies. This runs contrary to the modern context and Rawls' own particular derivation of international law and justice principles which are nation-state oriented and
which deny individual standing. But just such a derivation seems much
closer to his intent and Kantian approach.
Given that in this second model only one basic community structure
is in view, we should expect the choice problems to be formulated differently. Indeed, being now unhindered by the assumption of societal nation-states with individuated basic structures, choice problem number
one (involving principles for an institutional or basic domestic structure)
and choice problem number three (involving principles for an international structure) logically collapse into a single agenda item. Thus, under
Model 2, the original position agenda contains but two items or choice
problems: principles are to be acknowledged for (1) the basic institutional
structure [of global community], and (2) the natural duty of individuals.
As to the order of acknowledgment, Rawls' defense for a hierarchy for
choosing principles for the basic structure prior to those for natural duty
remains valid here: "while it would be possible to choose many of the
natural duties before those of the basic structure," some natural duties
and obligations "presuppose principles for social forms. . . . That principles for institutions are chosen first shows the social nature of the virtue

of justice.

.

.

.

"'5

Principles for the basic community structure, then, will

still be acknowledged first.
As previously noted, a more definite structuring of an original position for our model is required before moving to the choice of principles.
Following our earlier format as a guide to development, analysis begins
with the conditions for structuring an original position as discussed by
Rawls under the four headings of the circumstances of justice, the formal
constraints of the concept of right, the veil of ignorance and the rationality of the parties.
Since we begin in Model 2 with the very first agenda item, there will
be no need to investigate multiple hierarchical original positions. But, as
we proceed, it will become desirable to juxtapose the two original position
descriptions detailed under Model 1 with the single original position of
Model 2. In fact, many of the conditions outlined for the first original
position for the first two agenda items under Model 1 (designated MIA
for discussion) will appear unchanged in the original position under
Model 2 (M2). Other conditions under M2 will synthesize some of the
additional features found in the original position for the third agenda
item under Model 1 (MIB). This should not be too surprising since we
are dealing with a choice problem in M2 which partakes of both Model 1

55. Id. at 110.
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elements. (This triple comparison will culminate in a chart detailing all
three original positions under both models.)
Turning now to the conditions which define the structure of the original position M2, it is again apparent that those of universality, generality, publicity, ordering and finality (viz. the formal constraints of the concept of right) can be readily subsumed as proper conditions holding for
the choice of all ethical principles. Likewise, though disagreement may
not have abated, those conditions of mutual disinterestedness (limited altruism), lack of envy, use of effective means and strict compliance (viz.
the conditions of the rationality of the parties) can be incorporated to
develop a Rawlsian model. Also, keeping with our model definition, the
conception of the parties poses no difficulty and is similar to the conception found in MIA: since individuals comprise the component actors of
international community, the parties are conceived to be individual participants acting as continuous persons; the participants are not acting as
societal or national representatives. Thus, the difficulties of representative justifications do not arise under Model 2 as they did under Model 1.
This quick overview allows a setting aside of three sets of conditions.
No real problems for incorporation in the structure of M2 confront us.
The only conditions requiring broader analysis are those falling under the
headings of the circumstances of justice and the veil of ignorance. To
briefly review, the circumstances of justice specify that (1) conditions of
moderate scarcity exist; (2) there is a divergence of fundamental interests
and ends, with a variety of opposing and incompatible beliefs; and (3) the
scheme of basic institutions is a self-sufficient and productive scheme of
social cooperation. How are these conditions to be understood in M2?
Regarding the first circumstance, synthesis is greatly simplified. Participants in M2, representing continuing persons, will readily understand
that conditions of moderate scarcity exist as between the parties: natural
and other resources are not abundant enough to meet every claim; additionally, not only are resource levels finite, but uneven global distribution
will skew the factor of availability itself. Nor will it be difficult to interpret and apply the condition of moderate scarcity to and between nonself-contained and non-self-sufficient societies established by individuals'
circumscribed collective relations in the world community. Given the parties knowledge of general facts, they will recognize that skewed individual
and societal access to unevenly distributed resources of limited store creates individual, intra- and inter-societal conflicting claims. Thus, the first
circumstance of justice in M2 can be read in the following manner: natural, technological and other resources are unevenly distributed and of limited store, yielding a condition of moderate scarcity as to and between
individual and societal claims. In short, conditions of moderate scarcity
exist in the world community.
The second circumstance of justice can be approached in similar
fashion. Once again, participants in M2 will have little difficulty in interpreting the scope of divergent fundamental interests and incompatible
beliefs as between the parties. Acting as "rational agents of construc-
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tion" 5 with a conception of the good (though they know not what the
substance of that conception entails-an element of the veil in all accounts), the parties can reasonably entertain the assumption that not all
conceptions are congruent. They would rather expect these various conceptions to clash and to produce many (though surely not all) of the conflicting claims recognized under the first circumstance of moderate
scarcity.
Societies would also be expected to have divergent interests, goals
and beliefs. Societies, arising from the collective relationships of groups of
individuals situated territorially in the world community, are bound to
take upon themselves, as collectives, the beliefs and aspirations of its individual members as communicated through societal organizational channels (whatever form these57 may take). Now this certainly does not mean
that any single society so described is necessarily homogeneous and must
develop a common belief or interest pattern which only conflicts with another society's incompatible singularly defined belief or goal. Organizational channels of communication being imperfect mechanisms at their
operational best, some level of internal conflict seems inevitable, even if
stability is never threatened. On the other hand, though societal heterogeneity might be the more common experience, it is just as certainly not
required. Two (or more) societies, more or less internally homogeneous,
might develop patterns which are incompatible and then come into contact and conflict. The point is that just as with claims to resources, conflicts can be expected under this circumstance at multiple levels. Consider
the following actors and the possible basic conflict situations:

56. KCMT, supra note 8, at 520.
57. The indefinite referent "these" is purpose fully ambiguous. Not only beliefs and
goals, but organizational channels, can be expected to take multifarious forms in M2 societies. Recall that the choice problem of principles for ordering any single society is not an
agenda item in M2. Here, only the basic institutional structure of community is of concern.
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Due reflection permits the incorporation of the second circumstance
of justice in M2 with but the addition of a clarifying phrase. The circumstance will now read that there is a divergence of fundamental interests
and ends, with a variety of opposing and incompatible beliefs as to and
between individuals and societies.
Before turning to the third and final circumstance of justice involving
the scheme of basic institutions, a brief review of the role of the basic
structure would be helpful. Recall that the basic structure is the closed
background system of major institutions which distributes fundamental
rights and duties and determines the division of advantages of cooperation. In Model 2, the basic structure is that closed system of major international institutions whose object is justice. This scheme of basic institutions distributes the fundamental rights and duties and determines the
division of advantages of communal (i.e. individual and societal)
cooperation.5 8
The difficulty arising in M2 with this third circumstance is alike to
the problem encountered in M1B-a prescribed scheme of institutions
does not appear to exist. Despite this superficial similarity, the problem
here is not so acute. Given Model 1 assumptions, a predefined scheme to
generate international community was lacking and could not be assumed.
It had to be supposed that the need for interaction would be recognized
and acted upon to aid resolution of the third choice problem. Under
Model 2 assumptions, international community, like the concept of socia-

58. This central point concerns the scope of the application of justice as fairness: that
is, determination of what size and sort of community or associative activity over which the
theory of justice extends-the realm of its operation. In Rawls' discussion of sociability, we
were led to the notion of social union. Kelsen, supra note 48. This notion might best be
understood in the context of coordinated activity of a group of individuals who share final
ends and common activities which are declared to be) intrinsically valuable. TJ, supra note
1, at 525. Since the group is of indefinite size, we can speak of families and friendships-as
well as familiar and larger associations of clubs, churches, universities, and professional or
trade unions-as forms of social unions. Accordingly, a well-ordered community "is itself a
form of social union. Indeed, it is a social union of social unions" TJ, supra note 1, at 527.
Yet, justice as fairness does not provide a general theory for evaluating or directing the
course of all social unions:
In many if not most cases these principles [of justice as fairness] give unreasonable directive. To illustrate: for churches and universities different principles are plainly more suitable. Their members usually affirm certain shared
aims and purposes as essential guidelines to the most appropriate form of
organization.
BSS, supra note 8, at 49. Such social unions are subjects of justice, but they are not the
subjects to which the theory addresses itself. Rather, its concern and the domain over which
the theory applies is the primary subject of social justice, and "the primary subject of justice
is the basic structure" of community. TJ, supra note 1 at 7; similar formulations are employed at 54, 84. The principles of social justice apply then to the "social union of social
unions" and "the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights
and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" Id. at 7. That
is, justice is the object of the basic structure of a well-ordered community. Thus, while the
basic structure of Model 1 narrowly encompassed nation-state society, the basic community
structure of Model 2 encompasses global community. See Cheng, supra note 49.
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bility, is a factual description of the nature of man and interaction (with
interactive conflict) at all levels is reasonably assumed as a natural result
of this factual description. Put in slightly different perspective, just as
sociability "guarantees" collectives, community "guarantees" collective
interaction. This latter form of expression is somewhat misleading because it obscures our vision of individual characters. Nevertheless, it
makes clear that patterns of interaction and adjudication will develop
and it is the right of the basic structure to order those patterns of cooperation and adjudicate any conflicts which arise between parties. Thus, to
acknowledge principles for agenda item number one in M2 does not create ex nihilo a scheme of basic institutions; rather, given the facts of community and the first two circumstances of justice already noted above,
principles are to be chosen to order the scheme of basic institutions,
which structure is bound (as opposed to the "can" or "need" in MIB) to
arise, for the sake of justice.
In light of this analysis, it should be noted that the closed background system recognized by this third circumstance of justice leads to an
expansion of the chart of basic conflict situations previously outlined.
Three additions are necessary to complete the chart for M2:
Individual/Basic Community Structure (BCS) claims in conflict
(9) P v. BCS (individual societal member/BCS)
(10) S v. BCS (unassociated individual/BCS)
Societal/BCS claims in conflict
(11) A v. BCS (any society/BCS)
With this clarification in hand, the third circumstance in M2 should read
that for a scheme of basic institutions to exist for mutual advantage, principles must be chosen to order relations according to the dictates of
justice.
The final category of conditions requiring examination are those of
the veil of ignorance. As previously noted, the thickest veil possible is
desired; instead of starting with full information and then excluding just
enough to eliminate contingent factors, a Rawlsian veil excludes all information and then adds "just enough" so that rationally autonomous agents
can reach agreement. However, the factor of the thickness of the veil in
all situations is also directly related to the hierarchical position of the
agenda item being considered and its assumptions. Veil thickness in MIB
was greatly influenced by the fact that the choice of principles for a law
of nations was the third of three agenda items or choice problems. Incorporation of certain contingent factors at that point in the original position affected both the conception and knowledge of the parties, and compromised the ideal value of the theory.
Veil thickness in M2, on the other hand, is nearly identical with that
of MIA. Given that both deal with their respective number one agenda
items, this is an expected and desirable outcome. Behind these thick
veils, the parties in MIA and M2 are not influenced by any particular
information which can inappropriately influence their representation as
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free and equal moral persons. As a result, the ideal value of M2 is maintained. In fact, given the slight twist of interpretation required of some
factors due to the delineation between community and society, the veil of
M2 is nominally thicker than veil of MIA. Following is a partial demonstrative list of such veil conditions:
No one knows his place in society or if he is a member of a society
The parties do not know the particular circumstances of any society
They do not know any society's economic or political situation, or the
level of civilization and culture
They do not know any particular circumstances of international
community
They do not know the internationalcommunity's economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture.... 5
This analysis of the veil of ignorance concludes discussion of the conditions required to structure the original position under Model 2. All the
necessary elements have been considered. (Following is a comparative
chart detailing all three original positions formulated under both models.)
We can now deal with the M2 agenda item of choosing principles of international justice.

59. TJ, supra note 1, at 137. Emphasis supplied to indicate M2 additions.
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Once again, any constraints on choice solutions flowing from the conditions in the original position should be briefly covered before turning to
the derivation of principles, itself. To this initial coverage we turn below.
The discussion of the choice of principles under Model 1 opened with
an examination of two constraints which were laid upon the parties. The
task of acknowledging international principles to solve the third choice
problem was put under the constraints of coherence and strict compliance
and thereunder was the task discharged. But are these same constraints
to be found here?
Unlike the parties under the first model, participants in Model 2
should face no coherence constraints in their deliberations. Since the first,
not the third agenda item is being considered, no prior principles need be
taken into account; none exist. Only the basic assumptions or conditions
of the model confront the parties here. On the other hand, the condition
of strict compliance is a feature of all three original positions outlined in
previous discussion. As one of the present model conditions defining an
element of the rationality of the parties, the participants can reasonably
assume each other's good faith. That is, all can be expected to receive and
act in accordance with whatever principles are finally acknowledged.
Since the parties rely on this as a condition of the model, they will not be
generally concerned with sanctioning powers to induce compliance. Only
the psychological (motivational) problem of assurance in implementing an
ideal scheme is of any particular concern and this consideration should
solely affect the participants' reasonings in the subsequent operation of
the model, not while here acknowledging basic principles. Thus, the only
comparable operative constraint on reasoning towards international principles of justice under Model 2 is the model restriction that ideal, not
partial compliance theory is envisioned.
Turning to the actual choice of principles under the model, it might
be helpful to begin by taking a closer look at the conditions of the first
original position for Model 1 and the solution to its first agenda item or
choice problem, i.e. Rawls' domestic theory of justice as fairness. Given
the striking similarities between the structures of the original positions
MIA and M2, it would perhaps become possible to adopt some of Rawls'
reasonings or conclusions from the former domestic situation where similar conditions are met in our Rawlsian international model. In fact, by
taking this slightly discursive route, it becomes possible to argue that
Rawls' solution to MIA (viz. the general and special conceptions of domestic justice involving his two principles)" is also the solution-with a

60. The formulation of Rawls' general conception of justice rests upon the following
intuitive argument: Looking at the problem of the choice of principles from the viewpoint of
one of the participants, it would not be reasonable to expect agreement on a principle granting a greater than equal share in any division of the primary goods. Neither would it be
rational to put oneself at a (possible) disadvantage by agreeing to a principle distributing
less than an equal share. If this fairly states the case, the sensible thing to do is to initially
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few appropriate modifications-to M2.
How are we to understand Rawls' general and special conceptions as
possible solutions to M2? Turning to the conditions fo the structure for
M2, what differences exist and how might any difference affect the reasonings of the original position participants? If the solution to MIA is to
form a basic solution to M2, the hypothetical should be similarly
structured.
In fact, perusal of the original positions' comparative chart indicates
that the conditions outlined for MIA and M2 are nearly identical. Where
differences do occur, they are usually matters of phraseology, not of substance. The one difference which indicates more than mere turn-of-phrase
can be seen in the third circumstance of justice. In MIA, the scheme of
societal institutions comprising a basic structure is assumed to presently
exist. This scheme is a factor to be considered irrespective of the participants' time of entry. Although not pursued in previous discussions, this
assumption is an important one (and, of course, factually arguable in historical perspective), removing Rawls' theory from the mainstream of contract theories. This is evident in that Rawls does not attempt to create or
legitimate social union and basic schemes (something past theorists have
taken great pains to establish with their social contracts); rather, the
Rawlsian contract seeks only to order that which already exists for the
sake of justice.
The third circumstance of justice is rendered somewhat differently in
M2, with slightly different implications. Here, the scheme of institutions
comprising a basic community structure is only assumed to be assured of
coming into existence. Behind the veil, the participants cannot know

acknowledge principles of equality establishing equal liberty, equality of opportunity and an
equal distribution of income and wealth. These principles of equality lead to the formulation of a general conception of justice which can be expressed as follows: All social values-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to everyone's advantage (TJ, at 62). The formulation of Rawls' special conception rests upon an
argument for ranking these primary goods which yield certain priority rules. These rules, in
turn, work to order the principles of justice. Without rehearsing all the arguments
presented, the final statement takes the following form: First Principle-eachperson is to
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal liberties compatible with a
similar system of liberty for all. Second Principle-socialand economic inequalities are to
be arranged so that they are both: (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. First Priority Rule (The Priority of Liberty)-Liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less
extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all, and (b) a less
than equal liberty must be acceptable to those with the less liberty. Second Priority Rule
(The Priority of Justice over Efficiency and Welfare)-The second principle of justice is
lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages;
and fair opportunity (2(b)] is prior to the difference principle [2(a)]. Id. at 302-03, statement of two cases in second priority rule omitted. (This is the final compilation of several
provisional forms developed during argument for the theory.)
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whether such institutions already substantially exist or are only in early
developmental or formative stages. The historical question is left open.
What they do understand is that principles are required to order these
institutions for mutual good under justice. Again, this Rawlsian contract
does not create social union, but it does recognize the imported normative
element of legitimation also found in MIB. That is, M2 explicitly recognizes the self-legitimating function of justice as a circumstance. MIA does
implicitly recognize such a function, but only under the rubric of Kantian
autonomy and self-realization.
Is this difference substantive, affecting the reasonings of the parties?
Not at all. At least, there should be no substantive difference when reasoning towards basic principles. The conditions of M1A and M2 are effectively the same, though terminology and categories differ in respect of
legitimation. Both sets of parties recognize that a basic structure is an
inevitable factor in their deliberations and both sets seek mutual good
under principles of justice. If this difference is to have any discernible
effect, it is only in that a breakdown in deliberations leading to an egoistic stated of nature is not an acceptable option for M2 parties as it might
be on some interpretatious of M1A. 6' Where substantive differences can
be expected is in the later interpretation of international circumstance.
There, conceptual divergence in our models is great (compare MIB with
M2). What is required here is only an interpretative discussion of the
principles of equality under the Model 2 framework. A few modifications
are suggested below. Note that these modifications are due not to any
hidden structural difference, but are related to the concepts of community and society under our second model definition.
Modification 1 - As is implicit in Rawls' own discussion, the "persons" entitled to the most extensive total system of basic liberties are not
only individual human beings acting as moral agents. Generally speaking,
social unions, evidenced for example in families, churches and trade councils, existing as individuated collectives having an organizational "personality" are also to be afforded political liberites. e2 Under Model 2, societies
are similarly viewed as second-order social unions ordered by the basic
structure of the social union of social unions, the international community. This community scheme distributes rights, advantages and duties to
all its members, individuals and social unions (including societies) alike.
With this explicit understanding, the first principle of equal liberty is easily adopted in M2.
Modification 2 - Similarly, the principles of equality of opportunity
and equal distribution of income and wealth are readily adopted with the
understanding that the subjects of these principles remain consistent
with the subjects of modification 1. Thus, Model 2 can speak of inter-

61. Id. at 136.
62. See, eg., id. sec. 35 at 216-21, "Toleration of the Intolerant," where political parties
and religious groups are under consideration.
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societal, not just intra-societal, social and economic inequalities in the
world community.
Modification 3 - Rawls notes that one of the elements of basic liberty is the principle of free association. 3 What is not clear is whether
there exists a freedom to disassociate, although it could be reasonably
argued that this latter freedom is implied in the former. So that there is
no misunderstanding, this modification makes explicit the freedom to disassociate, notably at the societal level, and to remain unassociated if willing and able. This freedom may be exercised contingent upon one factor:
any standing obligations legitimately incurred in association must be discharged. Such a constraint is only reasonable. Rational parties could not
otherwise be expected to agree upon a principle which could so consistently work to their detriment. The modification is not intent on providing
an escape route, but views social union (e.g. societal membership) as fluid,
rather than more-or-less fixed for life. So circumscribed, the freedom is a
valuable one in international community.
Modification 4 - One final modification and interpretation is complete. We have spoken of the need to recognize collective personality in
relation to specific social unions, but what of collective assets? If they
exist (and there is no reason to assume they do not, given acknowledgment of group person-hood), does the general community have any call
upon resources individually or collectively possessed? Does mere possession imply a duty to share on a broad scale, or is community sharing simply a good which can be designated the outcome of a supererogatory act?
To put the question squarely, should the parties in M2 acknowledge a
principle that everyone has duties reciprocal in nature within the community in which he develops? A proper answer would aid understanding the
factor of "legitimately incurred obligations" in modification 3 above."
To form a reply, we should note not only that emphasis on community in Model 2 leans in the direction of acknowledging such a principle;
Rawls himself suggests acknowledgment of an obligation when he writes,
"Now when the maximum criterion is followed, the natural distribution of
abilities is viewed in some respects as a collective asset." 5 That is, while
the result of the natural lottery is morally arbitrary, development of those
distributed assets in not. The community has some degree of right to see
those talents used for the benefit of the whole in reciprocal response to
community provision of an environment in which the talents can be developed for the benefit of the talents' possessors. Just how this right is to
be weighted against a right of personal liberty is ticklish, but that the

63. Id. at 328-29.
64. Though apparently intruding in some degree onto second choice problem territory
of selection of individual duties, the question of institutional obligations appropriately arises
here as part of an analysis of the basic structure, especially given the intimate link with the
third modification. Obligations linking individuals and institutions should not be expected
to necessarily take the same form as those arising between individuals. Id. at 335.
65. Rawls, supra note 25, at 647.
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obligation exists is difficult to deny. That "no man is an island" is no less
true because quaint.
Neither is it difficult to understand this obligation in terms of large
social unions like societies. In fact, it is much easier to understand an
obligation of sharing, for example, excess natural resources than the benefits of personal talents. Such an interpolation seems less a strain on liberty, as well. The participants might well argue in the following fashion:
Inasmuch as societies are understood to be combined in a supreme
community, the individual societies are understood to have bound
themselves to the whole, because they wish to promote the common
good, but the whole to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for
the especial good of the individuals. [Likewise,] if a society is established, individuals bind themselves to the whole, because they wish to
promote the common good, and the whole binds itself to the individuals, because it wishes to provide for adequate life, for peace and security, consequently for the especial good of the individuals."
Such obligations, then, are always reciprocal in nature. Being for the common benefit or mutual good, communal obligations would generally be
acknowledged by the parties as long as they are founded upon the reciprocity in the community obligation to provide for free and full development of its members.

67

In light of these four modifications, the parties in M2 would acknowledge the following triad of principles and general conception:
(1) principles of equality
(a) equal liberty
(b) equality of opportunity
(c) equal distribution of income and wealth
(2) principles of free association
(a) freedom to associate
(b) freedom to disassociate
(c) free to be unassociated
(3) principles of obligation
(a) individuals have duties to community
(b) individuals may incur duties in social union
(c) community and union have reciprocal obligations towards
members
General conception. All social primary goods-liberties, obligations
and opportunities, income and command over resources, and the bases
of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least
favored.

66. Wolff, supra note 44, sec. 12, at 13-14 (the terms "society" and "community" are
here inserted, replacing "nation" and "state" respectively.
67. Cf. art. 29(1). "Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible" and its context as drawn from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948).
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These principles and the general conception naturally flow from the
Rawlsian hypothetical, given the great similarities and minor differences
between MIA and M2. Although the participants could now proceed to
develop parallel arguments for a special conception, it should be noted
that the special assumption permitting adoption of a lexical order is not
obviously present in Model 2: it cannot be assumed that conditions will
admit effective realization of liberties. Priority rules may only come to the
fore after much work with a fully developed scheme. Suffice to say that
lexical ordering remains the long-run tendency of the general view here as
in Model 1. The result would again be nearly identical. But application of
a special conception will not be taken for granted.
It should also be noted that the natural duties mentioned above as
the solution to the second choice problem in MIA are just as easily assimilated as the solution to the second choice problem in M2. Indeed, natural
obligations of fairness, justice and refraining from harm naturally flow
from the solution to the first agenda item (specially taking the third principle of obligation into consideration). Taken together, they form a coherent set of Model 2 principles for development of a basic structure for a
scheme of just institutions. Acknowledgment of these principles and a
general conception for a structural foundation for our model completes
this part. We can now turn to the task of outlining in the next part some
of the models' practical and theoretical implications in application.
III.

PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCES

In turning to analyze and compare the practical consequences of the
operations of our Rawlsian models, we shall focus discussion upon three
cases or situations which might conceivably arise in the international forum. In this way, the interaction of model principles to specify the parameters of a just resolution can be observed and any differences between
the models can be noted. The first two situations presented are types
which could occur under either ideal or non-ideal, but its type has been
all too common in our 20th century. The resolutions the models propose
as being just (especially in the final case) could bear significant weight in
relation to any considered judgments of fairness. In all cases, the proposed resolutions provide some insight into the relative strength of the
models heretofore developed.
Situation 1. The world economy consumes x tons of strategic mineral
y during an average annual productionschedule. All y at the present
time enters the production stream from land mining operations.
World reserves are estimated at 25x tons /- 3x tons, which is to say
that supplies will be exhausted within 22-28 years at current consumption levels. It is discovered that certain nodules from the deep
floor of the Alpha Sea contain significant amounts of y, along with
other valuable trace elements. Later research locates a sizeable field
of these nodules-estimatedyield of 5x tons /- .6 tons-situated at
roughly mid-point between bordering coastal societies A and B. Two
privately-owned companies (#1 and #2) located in prosperousA are
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prepared to attempt deep sea mining operations, either in concert or
with societal aid, if an adequate return on their investment can be
reasonably assured. The breakeven point is calculated at 3x tons,
which includes a 5-year lead time to develop the field and come online plus a 6-year mining schedule of .5x tons/year, leaving a marginal return on yields of 1.4x to 2.6x tons. One publicly-owned company (#3) in developing society B would like to work the field, but
requires economic and technical assistance or a partnershipventure
to do so. The breakeven point is here calculated at nearly 4x tons,
which includes a 7-year lead time plus a 12-year mining schedule of
.3x tons/year, leaving a marginal return on yields of .4x to 1.6x tons.
Assuming that technological and cost factors prohibit development of
more than one site in this field, who should begin mining, if anyone?
We shall not spend time working out questions of economic efficiency
in this or subsequent cases. The data bases are purposefully incomplete
for the benefit of generality, but they are also indeterminate for the benefit of justice. As Rawls notes, efficiency is a concern of the background
system of institutions to a lesser degree than the concern for justice. That
is, justice as fairness provides that the theoretically just parameters must
first be established; only then do concerns like efficiency intrude to order
the implementation of a solution." Thus, in narrowing analysis of these
situations to consideration of fairness, the primary concern of both models becomes the institutional and individual relationships engendered
with the case settings.
In this first situation, numerous relationships are in view and the
scope of the problem remains rather broad. Even in this simplified case,
upwards of ten basic ties and their permutations could be investigated.
Lest analysis become too cumbersome, intra-societal and other relationship ties will not be discussed; only the primary relationship between societies A and B are considered below.
Under Model 1, the configuration of basic and corollary principles
suggest the following parameters. Assuming A and B are nation-states,"'
B is equal with A (equality) and may of itself determine its need for y
and the desirability of mining nodules in the Alpha Sea (self-determination). It can decide its claim is of societal value (collective responsibility)
and press that claim in the international forum (self-defense), so long as
pressing the claim puts no prior agreement or treaty in jeopardy (pacta
principle). B may also later reserve, restrict or withdraw its claim (selflimitation) during any bargaining session. The same analysis pattern applies, pari passu, to A. What this analysis does not provide is a neat an-

68. TJ, supra note 1, at 9.
69. The model is limited to nation-states and does not appear capable of settling conflicts between non-statal conflicting parties. E.g., what if B were a non-statal nation or society? Neither does the model reach the question of "which company in A?" if the larger issue
of "which society?" is resolved in A's singular favor. Some other internal process or model
must then be invoked.

1986

RAWLSIAN THEORY OF INT'L LAW & JUSTICE

swer to the question originally put, "who should begin mining? The
model does tell us that, other factors being equal (e.g. there are no applicable bi- or multilateral treaties or international agreements specifically
resolving issues of ownership or access to this Alpha Sea floor), A and B
should meet as equals at the bargaining table to work out a fair resolution
of conflicting claims. But the model cannot, indeed was never meant to,
declare a right result before negotiations even begin.
What is perhaps interesting is what arguments cannot be pressed by
the parties under Model 1 during a bargaining session. Assuming A and B
are both (relatively) well-ordered states, A cannot press B to withdraw its
claim or sell its interest at a pittance as a simple function of A's economic
superiority. That is not fair dealing for an otherwise just state striving
towards an international society based on reciprocal relations. Neither
can A press an argument of greater right or privilege founded on technological capabilities. However, A could stress the economic advantage to B
of investing in A's venture through company #1 and/or #2, and the diseconomy to both states if B secured the aid it required to go ahead
through its company #3.
On the other hand, B need not be persuaded by the force of economic efficiencies, alone. It might highly value technological linkage and
the benefit to the society as a whole if #3 could work the field for 12
years, though it might realize only a minimal return above the breakeven
point on an accounting ledger. B may insist on its view, but being wellordered and wanting mutual advantage of all.70 With the give-and-take of
a fair bargaining session, A and B should be able to weigh the relative
merits of their claims and strike a mining agreement for the nodules
which can be deemed just.
Under Model 2, a more complicated structure makes analysis of this
situation relatively more difficult as principle factors and relationships in
view necessarily increase. The additional primary relationship considered
here is that between the Basic Community Structure (BCS) and societies
A and B. This relationship will be discussed along with the other primary
relationship between A and B, as in the model above. However, the increase in complexity permits a more tightly drawn set of parameters
which looks not only to the process, but to some of the very elements of
the result, of what is deemed just. Unlike Model 1, specific resolutions
may be forthcoming as information is gathered on the parties and their
claims. To that extent, Model 2 works similarly to Rawl's domestic theory

70. We initially ignore here, though it is certainly relevant, the interest other societies
have in adding five years' supply of strategic mineral y to world reserves at stable prices.
The bargaining process is discussed as if it were between only A and B, but claims would
surely be advanced by all user-states; under the model, all have a right to be heard and have
the relative merits of their claims weighed in striking any final balance to reach agreement
in the forum. The simple addition of states and claims do not, however, result in any change
in the model's operation and need not be considered for sake of illustration of model
efficacy.
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of justice as fairness in that teleological judgments are taken into account
while travelling the deontological path of pure (or quasi-pure) procedural
justice.
The BCS is responsible to distribute fundamental rights and duties
and to determine the division of advantages of cooperation of and for its
members, based on the principles and general conception of justice as
fairness formulated in Part II. Societies A and B are two such members,
whose conflict also involves community advantage. Thus, while we could
initially ignore other societal input under Model 1, the BCS must observe
community balance from the outset to formulate any final resolution.
To this end, basic questions concerning the status of the societies
directly involved must be addressed. For example: what is the relative
market share in y of A and B, both as suppliers and users? How would
71
access affect these shares? Is mining y a highly profitable enterprise? If
so, how much value would actually flow to society A? Society B? Once
these and similar questions receive sufficient statistical input, analysis
under the general conception can begin: would access to the field reasonably aid B in attaining community parity (principles of equality)? If B
does develop the field, can it meet its community obligations (including
price stability and steady delivery over the mining schedule per principles
of obligation)? Turning to A, would access too greatly enhance its position in the community? Would this enhancement be offset by A's contribution to the community's least favored? If A were required to aid B, how
great a cost is incurred monetarily? How great a price in terms of liberty?
Finally, assuming that the field should be developed (an obvious,
though not necessary assumption, questions of conservation and price
stability could be addressed as well), what are the possibilities or ramifications of introducing society Z (a developing land-locked society) to the
field? In the alternative, what of establishing a central mining enterprise
with general community authority for deep-sea-mining operations which
would distribute the fruits of its business to societies in need? 7 Without
pretending to answer all the issues raised, it can at least be observed that
the resulting parameters tend to a much more centrally organized system
of cooperation than under Model 1. A and B are not sitting together at a
bargaining table alone or with minimal outside input to develop the
framework of an agreement. Community factors play a dominant role in a
Model 2 analysis. This is not to say that similar issues of organization
could not be raised under Model 1. Such questions well might occur with

71. This need not refer to monetary input, alone. It can profit a society to grow technologically and to be able to expand inter-societal contacts, as well.
72. See the operation of the Enterprise in the text of the Law of the Sea Treaty. The
Enterprise (art. 170ff) is the functional production organ of the Authority (art. 156ff), which
is an international council in control of the Area (pt. XI) of deep sea resources for the
benefit of mankind (art. 140) United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/122, U.N. Doc. C/N.57(1983). See also, R. PLATZODER AND W. VITZTHUM (eds.),
SEERECHT-LAW OF THE SEA 69 (1984).
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even similar resolutions forthcoming as a result (e.g. Model 1 nationstates could agree on a central enterprise linked to private or statal investments). But the bases for centralized modeling will be quite distinct.
This difference is perhaps better illustrated in the next situation.
Situation 2. Society C has just harvested a bumper crop of winter
wheat far exceeding societal requirements. The goodly yield can be
attributed to a number of factors, including careful agricultural
management and beneficent weather patterns. At least one-third of
the current harvest can be expected to enter the export market, giving good additional return to producersand a boost to C's economy.
Nearby, society D is facing another harsh drought and basic foodstuffs are in short supply. With only a small industrialbase to draw
upon, D's treasury is rather limited and the relatively steep prices of
importing grain will keep the society from securing sufficient quantities to avert high levels of severe malnutritionor famine amongst the
populace.
What obligations, if any, does C have with respect to D and its people?
Under Model 1, there exists significant difficulty in defining the conflict involved within this particular case. It is clear that C's abundance
could timely aid D through any number of schemes, including lower
prices, extension of credits, long-term low-interest loans, grants and gifts,
or any combination of these devices. It is conceivably to C's advantage to
extend a helping hand now (C might suffer from a future drought and
need aid from D's goodly harvest). But there is no clear claim of right
that D can advance to secure C's help. Unless reciprocal factors historically exist (perhaps D extended agricultural aid to C in the past and has
yet to reap the advantage of that assistance), or some scheme of aid is
currently envisioned by treaty or agreement in the international forum
(perhaps C and D have a conventional or customary relationship whereby
each undertakes to aid the other in such distress), D appears unable to
insist on peremptory aid; it can only request supererogatory action from
C or others.
Now D can certainly make a general claim of right for itself and its
people. As a nation-state, it is equal with all other states and can press its
right to survive by requesting aid for its people (self-defense). It can recognize collective responsibility and incur long-term debts to this end and
even argue that mutual advantage in international society would be enhanced if a humanitarian assistance scheme were instituted. But what is
the relational tie being invoked? In what forum or against whom is this
right advanced? Can D perhaps invoke duty "to extend aid if it can do so
73
without excessive risk or loss to itself"?
It appears that until specific agreements or international schemes are
established to aid states like D, the right to assistance is an imperfect

73. TJ, supra note 1, at 114.
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right.7 4 In the absence of cooperative pacts, each nation will decide to
what extent aid can be rendered to others without neglecting internal
needs (self-determination), thus, each nation
must be allowed to abide by its own judgment in determining its action ... as to whether it can do anything for another without neglect
of its duty toward itself; consequently if that which is sought is refused, it must be endured.

...

75

In an international society striving towards just or reciprocal interaction,
we might well expect a scheme of aid to develop. It is not likely that D
would be allowed to collapse or its people die in famine. What is curious,
and somewhat troublesome, is D's apparent inability to force resolution of
the problem under the model. After presenting its case in all appropriate
fora, it must wait for others to decide to act. And if no one does?
Under Model 2, the community's obligation to aid a struggling member is never seriously in doubt. The reciprocal obligation inhering in the
relationship between the BCS and D (principle of obligation 3c) and the
requirements of the general conception necessitate a positive response to
the member's need. Aid will be provided for D and its people. 76 It would
thus appear that the models again begin to converge, the difference being
that Model 2 aid is certain, while Model 1 aid is only likely, though theoretically problematic. Neither model seems to recognize an enforceable
direct obligation that C aid D according to the extent of any excess supply of grain.

74. A perfect right carries with it a particularized duty. E.g., Q's perfect right to privacy
means that R has a corresponding duty not to invade that private sphere. An imperfect
right implies no such correlative determinate duty. Eg., R's imperfect right to sell does not
mean that Q has a duty to buy. In situation 2, D has the imperfect right of assistance, but
no correlative duty to extend aid from determine states can be implied.
75. Wolff, supra note 44, sec. 157, at 85. Wolff develops the distinction between perfect
and imperfect rights held by nation-states in ch. II, sec. 156ff. (For analysis of individual
relations, it could be useful to contrast Wolff's perfect and imperfect rights with Hohfeld's
analysis of jural correlatives and jural opposites, particularly a regards rights/duties and
privileges/no-rights, in Hohfeld, Some FundamentalLegal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YAL L. J. 16 (1913), and 26 YALE. L. J. 710 (1917).) Wolff goes on to

comment in sec. 158, "So, when the price of bread is high, no nation can compel another
nation to sell grain to it, even if it has ever so great a supply of grain, and is naturally bound
to sell." Compare the socially basic human rights defined in Luban, Just War and Human
Rights, 9 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 160, 177 (1980), which would permit D to declare a just war
against C if the latter refused to supply grain.
76. We ignore here, though it would need to be considered in a more detailed analysis,
the distinction between the societal organization (the local system of government and its
organizational channels of operations) and the people of the society. Individual members
will always have the right to call upon the BCS for help n such circumstances and that call
will always be considered in light of available resources. But, systems may be denied the
luxury of being propped-up after displaying dangerous ineptitude or (non-ideally) corrupt
practices (e.g., could the severity of the draught have been avoided under better administrative processes?). In fairness, questions like these could not be ignored. We do so here only to
simplify analysis and to keep the question in comparative focus.
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Although this surface result of the models is similar, the bases for
any aid rendered are quite distinct. Under both models, the question
"what obligations does C have with respect to D?" only carries explicit
content if direct links between the societies can be demonstrated (e.g.
trading relations, bilateral pacts or social interchange between societal
members). If no direct relations or linkages exist, no direct obligations
can be inferred. This lack of direct linkage led to the relative uncertainty
of an imperfect right under Model 1: D had no one to address with a
perfect right of aid, so no one needed to respond with a correlative perfect duty. D was dependent upon another society (like C) to recognize its
mutual advantage and/or its natural duty and agree to provide the necessary grain.
What is singularly different about the certain resolution under Model
2 is that the right to aid is a perfect right from the outset. It need not be
transformed into a perfect right on the basis of subsequent recognition or
agreement. However, this perfect right to aid is not a function of relations, direct or indirect, between C and D. The conflict of this case cannot
be construed or framed in simple or even complex inter-societal terms.
Rather, the conflict is to be framed as existing between D and the BCS.
So framed, an appropriate resolution of this conflict might be worked out
in the following stages:
(1) D has a dire need. D addresses this need to the BCS in terms of a
perfect right based upon the reciprocal relation in community
membership.
(2) The BCS acknowledges the need and the right under which it is
advanced.
(3) The BCS calculates the costs involved in meeting D's need and
balances available options in light of its duty to the community under
the general conception (e.g., how much grain? At what price? From
which stores? Through what supply channels? Are other direct obligations involved?)
(4) The BCS invokes its right in reciprocal relation with C (and/or
others) to provide stores from its excess under the fair terms determined in stage (3).
(5) C responds to the BCS based on its community duty.
(6) D is supplied through appropriate distributional channels.
In this scheme, direct linkage is not forged (though it may develop) between members. But, interaction for the sake of individuals-in-community is facilitated as the institutions of the basic structure organize and
distribute community primary goods.
In turning to discuss the third and final case, we enter the arena of
non-ideal or partial compliance theory conditions. Time and space do not
permit an analysis of all the variables involved in translating ideal theory
into non-ideal settings, but some basic outlines will be drawn to provide a
sketch of the issues raised (or avoided) by the models.
Situation 3. Society E was once politically homogeneous. Internal
disagreements were rare and when they did arise, organizational
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channels easily absorbed this energy and directed it into constructive
avenues within the system. Recently, political dissent has increased
with a concomitant increase in minority opposition to some of E's
internal policies. The system is having difficulty coping with this
drive towards heterogeneity and has begun to suppress dissent.
When minimal jail terms for infractions of a limited free speech and
assembly provision proved ineffective in deterring opposition, prison
sentences were lengthened and labor camps were erected. Such internal exile has since become common and opportunities to leave the
society are severely restricted. Once relatively open, E is now a
closed society. Although the government of E denies it is attempting
to quell dissent n this manner, reports of these internal activities
continue to come to the attention of other societies.
What obligations, if any do these other societies have in respect of E and
its people?
Model 2 provides parameters which can readily be applied to the situation above. Being ultimately responsible for intra-societal, as well as
inter-societal, conflict, the BCS must provide a final authoritative forum
for this type of individual/societal dispute. If investigation confirms the
reports that principles of free association and obligation are being unjustly abridged (specifically, the freedom to disassociate and societal obligations of fairness), the societal system must answer for its unjust actions.
(Here, the distinction between the system of government and the people
comes to the fore.) As a minimal solution, internal reform acceding to a
formal heterogeneity seems required. In the alternative, two (or more)
separate social unions might be nurtured as homogeneous replacements.
If necessary, the societal form could be disbanded and reorganized along
entirely wholly new hierarchical channels. Whatever the solution justice
as fairness demands, it would indeed be done.
In such a non-ideal situation, force might be employed to secure the
reorganization if resistance were encountered. In this extremity, jus ad
bellum principles would need to be invoked and jus in bello principles
would need to be developed if not already to hand. A show of force is
perhaps problematic for the model, since ideal development ignored just
war theory and provided only for problems of assurance. But there is little doubt that principles for just armed conflict would not present an ineffable barrier in developing a partial compliance response.
On the other hand, Model 1 parameters are essentially lacking. Just
as the model could not even reach the question of "which company?" in
situation 1, the principle of equality and its corollary of self-determination can operate so as to peremptorily preclude interference or even investigation into the internal affairs of another equal, self-determining nation-state. How E treats its own people is its own affair, being between
that people and its system of government. Presumably, this shroud is of
negligible import when more-or-less just states are in view under an ideal
theory of strict compliance. But it is not at all clear that the shroud can
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be justifiably lifted even under reinterpreted or relaxed principles in a
partial compliance international society of Model 1 proportion or design." It seems that Model 1 nation-states have an extremely limited response indeed. Besides lecturing E for its apparent abuse, international
society can invoke no particular principle or duty of state relations to
chide E. Neither can the distressed people of E invoke any international
principles in a call for assistance or internal reform.
If E were simply an example of an errant, over-zealous or cruel administration in an otherwise just international society, a case might be
made that the principles informing international society should only apply to those states whose domestic arrangements (continue to) satisfy the
two basic principle of domestic justice (per choice problem number one in
the model's first original position). Since E is in obvious contravention of
the special (and apparently even the general) conception of justice as fairness, international statal equality and non-intervention (self-determination) principles need not apply. The state has placed itself beyond the
pale of legitimate invocation of principles of fairness as between states by
its own unjust (though internal) actions. Thus, other states desiring to
investigate and intervene on (supererogatory) humanitarian grounds
might fairly do so.7"
Unfortunately, this is a weak argument for at least two reasons. First,
intervention is still not required by any principles of justice. Those suffering injustice will have to wait (as did society D in situation 2, above) for
any aid. More importantly, why should international principles of justice
be deemed contingent given the nature of the model? Is a criminal offender in domestic society fairly dealt with if treated inhumanely (i.e.,
ultra vires principles of justice) when he breaks his tacit "contract" to
conform to certain societal laws? Granted the analogy is not perfect, but
an argument declaring that primary principles of reciprocal dealing can
be set aside if the (third-party) contract is (partially) broken leaves one
huge authoritative gap-who decides that a breach exists? and what sanctions apply? Without a recognized authoritative agency to guide the parties in a partial compliance situation, the principle that "principles can be
deemed inoperative" is systemically destructive. Such an argument is
even more dubious in an international society filled with partial compliance actors ("let he who is without sin cast the first stone"). Once the
assurance factors of an ideal theory reveal such insufficiency, the model
will begin to breakdown; it must then either evolve of collapse.

77. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4: "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations."
78. As in situation 2, Luban is prepared to suggest that a war of intervention is justified
and even morally "urgent"; views which argue against intervention based upon a principle of
self-determination are labelled "obscene" or "perverse," as well as illogical "doublethink."
Luban, supra, note 75, at 178-81. Cf. Wicclair, supra note 11, at 298 and 300-01.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 14:2-3

Note that under Model 1, the principled inability to act is not directly related to enforcement ability. There is little question that international society could martial sufficient numbers to rout an oppressive regime; its might is sufficient. Neither is the problem directly related to or a
function of cost (though cost factors are involved and need to be considered). Rather, the problem lies in the absence of a formal mechanism capable of determining "rightness" in statal dealings under the model.
When basic disagreements between the parties result in statal impasse,
no authority exists which can cut the Gordian knot.
It might be argued that under Model 1, a more-or-less just international society would agree to precisely such an authoritative agency (like
a Security Council or International Court) to meet contingencies where
assurance factors are insufficient. Thus, the priorities of nation-state
equality and self-determination would be superceded by a principle of
community responsibility. But to the extent that states recognize this responsibility and establish a super-statal agency which has recognized, formal declaratory (and, perhaps, enforcement) power, the model has begun
evolving into a Model 2 structure with an international BCS.
We are not prepared to argue that Model 2 is the full and natural
outcome of modifying Model 1 to meet partial compliance conditions. But
with the relative strengths and weaknesses of the models now in view, it
is interesting that Model 2 principle seem to lead to practical applications
more consistently in accord with considered judgments of fairness formerly encountered. Although the model distinctions in situation 1 were
mere adumbrations of variances to come, operational differences began
more clearly to appear in situation 2 and are visible in full relief here in
situation 3. Having glimpsed some of these more important differences,
we turn next to consider the models under Rawls' device of reflective
equilibrium. In this concluding part of the essay, we consider what it
means to choose one of these models over the other on the basis of justice
as fairness.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Rawls' device of reflective equilibrium is not novel,7' but he employs
it in a deceptively powerful manner. Striving to establish a deductive connection between his two principles of domestic justice and his original
position (proposing that the former's conclusions be logically derivable
from the latter's premises), he reaches for a kind of "moral geometry with
all the rigor which this name connotes." 80 In working out this geometry,
the reader is asked to reflect upon his considered convictions of justice
and the conditions of fairness embodied in an original position. If the
principles which can be derived (deduced) from an acceptable initial situation of fairness match (yield) firm considered judgments, well and good.

79. TJ, supra note 1, at 20 n.7.
80. Id. at 121.
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If not, modify either the initial situation, or the considered convictions, or
both, until a match (equilibrium) is established. If this final coherent
view comprehends philosophically favored conditions for an original position, a procedure of justification for the conception of justice exists as
well.
This device is useful not only for developing conceptions of justice,
but also for examining conceptions offered as just solutions to the problem of social justice in a given context. For example, Rawls first employs
a reflective equilibrium to establish his original position and its two special conception principles; he then employs the same device to challenge
the value of average utility (finding it a relatively unstable conception) in
the societal arena.81 In similar manner, this part is devoted to applying
considerations of reflective equilibrium to the two models of international
justice which have been developed in this article.
Focusing attention on three hypothetical cases of international scope,
we have examined the questions which the models raised and the parameters or conclusions proposed in respect of coordinating cooperative efforts
for resource recovery (situation 1); coordinating relief efforts for the disadvantaged (situation 2); and coordinating response to deviation from
just norms (situation 3). In all three cases, Model 2 operated in equilibrium with considered judgments of fairness as it presented a coherent
conception of international justice. Coordination was not only just, but
other values like efficiency could also appropriately be accounted for in
the model's responses. In contradistinction, only in situation 1 did Model
1 similarly operate in equilibrium. As a conception of international justice, this model was found to be relatively unstable in situation 2 and
appeared wholly inadequate in meeting the demands of considered convictions of justice in situation 3.s 2
Can Model 1 be salvaged? Can we perform a reflective equilibrium
operation and save the patient? If this means modifying considered convictions so that the results noted above can be sustained, probably not.
Deeming the results in situation 2 acceptable is less problematic, but the
lack of response in situation 3 is difficult, if not impossible, to confirm on
reflection. On the other hand, if salvaging the model means toying with
the original position, two possibilities come to mind: (1) modify the motivational assumptions of the parties to reach more accommodating princi81. Id. secs. 27 and 28, 161-74.
82. Time and space will not be taken to formulate a full discussion but the inadequacies illuminated are arguably a necessary function of the introduction of a morally arbitrary
element defining the scope of Model l's first choice problem. See supra note 25, and accompanying text. Not only model consequences but model principles themselves are subject to
reflective equilibrium considerations. Without more, it seems undesirable if not ad hoc to
introduce a morally arbitrary delimitation into an otherwise basic, fair position. Thus, consequences aside, we may have strong reason to prefer Model 2's original position and principle over Model l's. Supporting argument would be analogous to discussion of thick v. thin
original position veils of ignorance and their reflection of a basic conception of free and
equal persons. See supra notes 16-17, 33-34.
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pies and results; or (2) modify the structural components of the initial
situation. If the first option is taken, it is more likely than not that a
Model 2 structuring will be the result. This is what occurred when a modification was attempted in discussion under situation 3, above. If the second option is considered, and pains are taken to avoid imitating Model 2,
an equilibrium can conceivably be achieved, but I dare say that the model
would no longer be Rawlsian in nature. In the great scheme of things such
a result is not devastating, but Rawlsian models are, after all, the theme
of this essay.
Should this analysis hold, sufficient data is now available to address
the interrogatory originally defining our project, "Which model more
closely matches considerations of justice as fairness in the international
arena"? On the basis of the findings presented above, we are bound to
choose Model 2 over Model 1 as that Rawlsian model of international
justice which best expresses a stable and coherent conception of justice as
fairness. Having such a model to hand, we, as fully autonomous moral
beings, are thereby philosophically justified in selecting that model as our
own. Vade, et tu fac similiter.

